O rganization structure acts as a lens on the environment, gathering information and shaping its flow through a firm to inform managers' choices. This shaping of information flow happens through an organization's operating units, which selectively process information from the environment, and through the links between them, which pass information between units. We explore the relationship between this "information infrastructure" and firm strategy using structure and service information from the eight largest telephone service providers in the United States from 1984 to 1998. We find that firms with more units that scan areas of opportunity are more likely to enter a market, while firms with more units that scan nonfocal areas are less likely to enter the market. We also find that personnel links between units and the corporate level of the firm often constrain entry to new markets by dampening a unit's appetite for risk. Personnel links between operating units, on the other hand, can make a firm more likely to enter new markets, particularly when the cooperating units combine different sets of information. Thus, a firm's information infrastructure plays a dual role in shaping firm evolution, leading toward some paths and away from others.
Introduction
Research on business evolution suggests that firms that compete in the same environment commonly assess the environment differently and make very different competitive choices, such as the choice of new market segments in which to operate (Nelson and Winter 1982, Axelrod 1997) . However, evolutionary research rarely examines the mechanisms that cause variation in the ways that competitors respond to emerging opportunities. This paper studies how firm structure shapes market entry. Combining the structural insights of information-processing contingency theory (Galbraith 1973) with an evolutionary approach to organizations, we argue that the structure of organizations acts as a lens that shapes the flow of information from the environment through the firm. This information infrastructure will encourage or inhibit market entry, depending on whether the structure directs attention toward or away from an opportunity in the marketplace.
The information infrastructure approach to evolution helps explain how firms change. Evolutionary research shows that firms tend to be stable Freeman 1989, Helfat 1994 ) and change incrementally (Allen 1977 , Arrow 1974 , Rosenbloom and Christensen 1994 , Helfat and Lieberman 2002 , Ramanujam and Varadarajan 1989 . In addition, though, research suggests that information from outside an organization can contribute to change (Rosenkopf and Nerkar 2001, von Hippel 1988) . By focusing on the evolutionary impact of information processing, we are able to study the direction of firms' ongoing adaptation in dynamic environments.
We treat the grouping of activities into operating units and the linking of those units as two key elements of structure (Galbraith 1973 , Mintzberg 1979 . We predict that firms are more likely to enter market segments that share the same customers, products, functions, or locations targeted by the firm's operating units; we call these fit units. The presence of units that do not share characteristics with a given market, which we call nonfit units, will reduce entry to that market. We further propose that links between units, as well as links between units and the corporate level, amplify the effects of fit and nonfit units.
We test our hypotheses using a sample of U.S. local telephone companies from 1984 to 1998. The firms begin the sample period with nearly identical structures and services and then actively adapt through a period of rapid industry change. The results are consistent with the proposition that unit structure and linkages both encourage and constrain market entry. The findings also suggest intriguing areas for future exploration. We find that links between operating units consistently increase entry, thereby increasing firm dynamism, while links to the corporate level contribute to inertia by inhibiting entry.
Background: Information Infrastructure
An extensive literature addresses the relationship between strategy and structure. Early work argued that structure followed strategy. In his landmark history, Strategy and Structure, Alfred Chandler (1962) argues that American corporations created the multidivisional form to meet the administrative challenges of diversification. Four decades of research in this tradition suggest that firms choose between specialization efficiencies from functional structures and reduced coordination costs of product division autonomy in multidivisional corporations (Armour and Teece 1978 , Fligstein 1985 , Palmer et al. 1993 , Williamson 1975 .
Strategy researchers who emphasize the decisionmaking aspects of strategy argue that organization structure also affects the direction of change in a firm. Conceptual work has long recognized "the organizational reality that strategy also follows structure" (Andrews 1971, p. 15) . Scholars propose that the structure of a firm influences the nature of decision making (Fredrickson 1986) , which information firms use in planning (Hall and Saias 1980) , and the distribution of managerial attention (Ocasio 1997) . While the influence of structure on strategy has been widely noted, this insight has not been conceptually or empirically developed in depth.
Our central argument is that organization structure acts as a lens on the environment, gathering information and shaping its flow through the organization to inform managers' choices. This shaping of information flow happens through the organization's operating units, which selectively process information from the environment, and through the links that transmit information between units. These two elementsthe units into which a firm divides itself and the links between those units-are the basic elements of our theory of structure and information processing. We refer to these elements as a firm's information infrastructure.
Information infrastructure builds on informationprocessing and behavioral theories of the firm (Galbraith 1977 , March and Simon 1958 , Stinchcombe 1990 , Tushman and Nadler 1978 . As it searches for opportunities and threats in changing markets (Cyert and March 1992, Nelson and Winter 1982) , an organization must reduce the boundless mass of potential information to a manageable and meaningful set of signals (Arrow 1974) . A firm's operating units act as a locus of information gathering, because units interact frequently with suppliers, customers, industry associations, regulators, and other key sources of information (Stinchcombe 1990) .
Different types of units tend to gather different types of information. For example, customer units monitor and evaluate the expectations of customers and focus on meeting those needs (Mintzberg 1979) . Functional units gather and process information that affects their operation: demand trends concerning their functions, changes in administrative techniques that pass through related professional circles, and technical innovations that change their tasks (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967) .
The idea that operating units gather information builds on Thompson's (1967) argument that some units specialize in monitoring portions of the marketplace. The theory also generalizes the argument that R&D component design groups gather information related to their particular component (Henderson and Clark 1990) . We view each unit of the firm as oriented to aspects of the environment that correspond to the unit's characteristics.
The links within a firm serve to further process and transmit information. Links between units allow a firm to coordinate interdependent activities (Galbraith 1973 , Mintzberg 1979 . In effect, links pass information that units require to adjust their activities toward a common goal (Thompson 1967) . Links arise when personnel in different units develop informal and formal ties: personal networks based on historical relationships, cross-unit teams, formally defined linking managers, dual-hierarchy systems, and other matrixtype systems (Galbraith 1977) . When two units orient to similar elements of the environment, links allow them to share information and coordinate their responses. When two units orient to different parts of the environment, links combine complementary information from different areas. To foreshadow our analysis, we operationalize linkages in terms of managerial career paths, which measure unit and corporate managers' historical links to other business units.
Our approach to information infrastructure distinctly complements the activity-based approaches of absorptive capacity and related diversification. Absorptive capacity suggests that maintaining specific activities, such as basic R&D, within the firm will make the firm more able to use relevant information from the environment (Cohen and Levinthal 1990) . The diversification literature explains market entry as a function of sharing related activities across different product markets (Ramanujam and Varadarajan 1989) . In contrast, we propose that structuring the same activities differently will lead to contrasting information infrastructures and divergent evolutionary paths.
Hypotheses
We develop two sets of hypotheses. We first consider how the relationship between a firm's units and potential markets influences market entry, then how horizontal and vertical links from unit to unit and to the corporate level of a firm influence market entry.
Fit and Nonfit Business Units
Evolutionary theories argue that organizations favor local information search (Cyert and March 1992, Nelson and Winter 1982) . Local search suggests that firms perceive opportunities that arise where units scan. For instance, a firm with a unit that focuses on a geographic area is most likely to recognize opportunities that arise within the focal area (e.g., Latin America). Similarly, a firm with a unit devoted to new media is more likely to recognize opportunities to serve consumers in entertainment markets such as cable television or Internet-based services.
A firm will also be more able to evaluate and act on information about an opportunity when more units gather information about that opportunity. Through frequent interaction and fine-grained information sharing, members of a group tend to develop several things: a shared understanding about the key signals from the environment, a language to communicate their understanding of these signals, and judgments about the relative importance of different types of information. Through this learning process, units develop an information short hand, which becomes the body of common knowledge within the group (Arrow 1974) . This common knowledge makes an organization more able to evaluate and act on opportunities that appear uncertain to others. In turn, the ability to perceive and act on relevant information will influence whether a firm enters new market segments.
To again foreshadow our analysis, we develop industry-specific information dimensions arising out of Gulick's (1954 Gulick's ( /1937 four categories of organization grouping: customer, product, function, and location. These categories reflect an orientation to different aspects of the environment. A customer unit focuses information gathering on a set of clients; a product grouping focuses information gathering on a product market and competitors; a functional unit focuses information gathering on process technologies and administrative techniques; and a geographic unit focuses attention on regional markets and local demand. Specific opportunities that arise will relate to different subsets of these dimensions of the information environment. Thus, we describe an organization's units and its potential markets by the customers to which they relate, the products they provide, the functions they require, and the regions they serve.
We label units that share one or more of a market segment's information dimensions as fit units in relationship to that market.
1 For instance, a corporate data services unit is fit in relation to the mobile data market because both serve business customers and provide data services. With more fit units in relation to a market segment, a firm will gather and share more information relevant to that market. We predict that fit units will increase the likelihood of entry.
Hypothesis 1a. The more fit units a firm has in relation to a market segment, the more likely the firm will enter the market segment.
On the other hand, the existence of business units that do not share information dimensions with a given market segment makes it less likely that a firm will act on opportunities related to that segment. As Hall and Saias (1980, p. 156) argue, "Structural characteristics act like filters and limit what the organization can see." Similarly, Fredrickson (1986) suggests that as roles within an organization become more narrowly defined, members of an organization are less likely to recognize an important stimulus as a strategic issue.
As the center of information processing in a firm shifts away from a particular market, the firm's structure, systems, people, and rewards orient the decision makers to other parts of the environment. Galbraith and Kazanjian (1986) refer to this as the center of gravity of an organization. As the number of units not oriented to a market rises, the firm becomes more likely to filter or ignore information about that market. A unit will be less likely to mobilize resources and support needed for entry when other units have little information about the opportunity.
We define units that share no structural dimensions with a market segment as nonfit units. For example, GTE's lightbulb unit is nonfit in relation to the mobile paging market because the unit and the market share no customers, product categories, or functional activities. With more nonfit units in relation to a market 1 Our notion of a fit unit is more modest than conventional contingency theory. Contingency theory treats fitness as a firm-level interaction between environment, structure, and performance: In the presence of a given environmental condition (e.g., rapid change), a given structure (e.g., flat hierarchy) is expected to have a significant, positive impact on performance (Schoonhoven 1981) . Firms with extreme misalignments perform worse than others (Burton et al. 2002) . In contrast, our construct of fitness implies only that news about a market segment will arise in parts of the environment that a unit scans (Stinchcombe 1990 ). segment, a firm will gather and share are relatively less information relevant to that market. We predict that nonfit units will decrease the likelihood of entry. Horizontal links between business units will amplify the influence of fit or nonfit units by increasing the sharing or filtering of information between those units. Links between units enable ongoing operations through information sharing and mutual adjustment of activities (Galbraith 1977 , Mintzberg 1979 . As regular communication paths, links act as informal networks that transmit information regarding perceived opportunities and threats. Informal networks will be particularly important to sharing fine-grained information and managerial interpretations of the firm's future development (Burt 1992 ). Thus, links will affect entry by amplifying information from the environment through sharing, while filtering other information by directing attention away from its source.
Horizontal links between fit units increase the likelihood of entry into a new market segment by increasing the reliability of information through redundant sourcing and bringing together incomplete information about a market. Sharing distinct but related information will improve the firm's assessment of an opportunity because it increases the amount of information and the diversity of perspectives involved in gathering and interpreting information.
Information about an opportunity is more likely to be judged as reliable, relevant, and important when it arises in several parts of the organization. Thus, the case for entry strengthens across the company and within each unit when separate units with different perspectives gather and emphasize similar information.
Hypothesis 2a. The more horizontal links between a firm's fit units for a given market segment, the more likely the firm will enter the market segment.
Links between fit and nonfit units will also increase the likelihood that a firm enters a market segment. These links bring together information about a market segment with information from other parts of the environment. This combination of unrelated information contributes to market entry by increasing innovation.
Information from the environment is important for innovation (Christensen and Rosenbloom 1995 , Stinchcombe 1990 , von Hippel 1988 . Innovations represent new combinations of productive resources or "new patterns of information and material flows among existing subroutines" (Nelson and Winter 1982, p. 130; Schumpeter 1934) . Such combinations require new perspectives to generate novel insights and bring together previously separate resources and concepts. One way to build new perspectives is to bring together information from unrelated parts of the environment. Thus, links between fit and nonfit units create opportunities to explore innovative recombinations of resources that relate to a given market segment and therefore encourage entry.
Hypothesis 2b. The more horizontal links between a firm's fit and nonfit units for a given market segment, the more likely the firm will enter the market segment.
By contrast, we expect that a greater number of links among nonfit units will reduce the likelihood that a firm enters a particular market. Tight links among units that do not share characteristics of a market reinforce the individual tendencies of such units to avoid the new markets. As Hall and Saias (1980, p. 156 ) point out, "[i]nformation is often interpreted and changed by the way in which it is transmitted." Information sharing between nonfit units will amplify information from parts of the environment unrelated to a focal opportunity. As the attention of managers across the firm focuses on other parts of the environment, decision makers will increasingly filter out information relevant to a focal opportunity even if it is gathered and shared by fit units. Even managers in fit units will be less likely to attend to information when the informal culture of the organization is preoccupied with other areas. Thus, increased links between nonfit units will make a firm more likely to filter information relevant to a focal opportunity and thus less likely to enter a given market segment.
Hypothesis 2c. The more horizontal links between a firm's nonfit units for a given market segment, the less likely the firm will enter the market segment.
Vertical links involving fit units, that is, those between a business unit and the corporate offices of a firm, may also increase the likelihood of entry. Vertical links can carry information from business units to the top level of the organization. Sending information to corporate levels of the firm can transmit it to other, nonlinked units of the firm through executives. This spreads and reinforces information pertaining to the portions of the environment that the business unit scans and may in turn increase the likelihood of entry into market segments in those parts of the environment. In addition, links to the corporate level are likely to influence the struggle for resources to launch new products and services. Moreover, links from the corporate level to fit units will spread the corporate perspective on firm goals, helping managers make the case more effectively for the opportunities available to their unit.
Hypothesis 3a. The more vertical links between the corporate level and a firm's fit units for a given market, the more likely the firm will enter that market.
By contrast, corporate managers are less likely to be interested in opportunities they receive less information about. Links from nonfit units to the corporate level will lead to increased filtering of information relevant to a focal opportunity. In addition, promotion paths between nonfit units and the corporate level of the firm are strong indications that a focal opportunity lies outside the awareness of managers. Galbraith and Kazanjian (1986) suggest that promotions to top executive positions indicate the center of gravity of a firm. If a focal opportunity lies outside the center of gravity, then routines, management systems, and mind-sets will orient away from the parts of the environment where a focal opportunity arises. Thus, a firm with links between nonfit units and the corporate level will be less likely to attend to information about a focal opportunity.
Hypothesis 3b. The more vertical links between the corporate level and a firm's nonfit units for a given market segment, the less likely the firm will enter the market segment.
In summary, we predict that the information characteristics of a firm's organization structure will influence the firm's tendency to enter new market segments. We define information structure along four dimensions: customer, product, function, and geography. We argue that likelihood of entry will rise with greater fit between a firm's units and a potential marketplace. We further argue that more links between fit units (horizontal from fit to fit and from fit to nonfit, and vertical from fit units to the corporate level) will increase entry. We also expect that the structure constrains entry. Greater numbers of nonfit units will reduce entry as the organization directs more attention to information from other parts of the environment. Links between nonfit units will filter out information about a focal opportunity as the organization shares and amplifies information from unrelated parts of the environment. Finally, links between nonfit units and the corporate level will increase filtering and reduce entry, as the center of gravity in an organization orients it to other opportunities.
Empirical Approach
We collected data on the evolution of service capabilities in the U.S. telecommunication industry over 15 years. Our longitudinal sample consists of eight companies in the local telephone service market from 1984 to 1998: Ameritech, Bell Atlantic, Bell South, Nynex, Pacific Telesis, Southwest Bell, US West, and GTE. The eight firms had comparable size and resources. Seven of the firms were holding companies for regional Bell operating companies (RBOCs) that were created by AT&T's breakup in 1984. The other, GTE, was the only other firm of comparable size with the Bell companies.
2 The study period was one of increasing regulatory and technological change in the telecom industry, with new market segments opening each year during the period. With radical change looming, telecom firms in this period entered many new market segments in attempts to keep up with a shifting market.
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The study has several components of a natural experiment, since most of the firms were founded in 1984 with the same structure and services. The seven RBOC companies began in 1984 with shared histories (as units of the same firm), but over the 15-year period they adopted different structures and pursued different new markets. Bell Atlantic, for example, focused its early expansion in financial and business services. Ameritech and Bell South, meanwhile, entered the international arena by bidding for cellular licenses. As initial choices led to different structures, the firms' choices became increasingly varied.
We gathered information on the business units, services offered, and personnel links between units from company annual reports and SEC 10K filings. Structural information consisted of lists of senior officers, which included group presidents for major business units in each of the sample firms. Line of business data came mostly from annual 10K filings with the SEC. The appendix describes the variables and reports summary statistics.
Using this multiyear sample offers several strengths. Consistent and comparable data on structure and service is available for the longitudinal 2 These eight companies accounted for 92% of the access lines reported by the Federal Communications Commission in 1990 (FCC 1990) . GTE was comparable in size to the seven Bell holding companies (GTE was larger than Southwestern Bell during the first half of the study). The next largest firm in the industry served less than one-third of the lines of the smallest firm in the sample in 1990. sample over 15 years. The telecom industry contains many market segments, which creates a large number of market and firm structure relationships to assess in our analysis. Moreover, almost all variation in structure and market entry starts at the beginning of the period. In addition, the sample firms account for more than 90% of U.S. local telephone services and are key actors in the national economy.
Measures
The appendix provides descriptions, statistics, and correlations for the variables in the study. We describe the measurement and coding of the key variables below.
Business Units. We identified business units from the listing of senior executives in the companies' annual reports. If a president or CEO was listed for a business unit, we included the unit in the list for the firm for the given year. The number of units for a firm ranged from a low of 3 for US West in 1998 to 41 for SBC (see Footnote 3) in the same year.
Information Dimensions of Business Units. We coded information structure based on Gulick's four categories of customer, product, function, and geography. We used common industry categories and the composition of business units within the sample to develop 25 subcategories (Table 1) within the four broad categories. We then coded every business unit based on these 25 subcategories. A unit's domain equaled 1 if it related to a category, as described by the company; otherwise it was zero. Thus, we assigned each of 1,600 business unit-year combinations with a 25-entry vector that described the unit's information dimensions. We discussed the categorization with industry analysts to ensure that the assignments were reasonable. Table 2 gives examples of this coding for several business units.
Fit and Nonfit Units. We coded a unit that shared at least one information dimension with a market segment in a given year as a fit unit. Similarly, we coded units that shared no information dimensions as nonfit units.
Links. We used the listings of senior executives to measure links between business units, using career paths as the indicator of linkages. If an executive moved from one unit to another, we coded a link existing between these units as long as the executive remained in the new position. For managers who moved multiple times during the study period, we consider links as existing between a manager's current division in a given year and any divisions where the manager previously worked.
4 Social networks have a strong impact on promotions for executives (Burt 1992 ) and lead to fine-grained information sharing between individuals (Uzzi 1996) . Thus, career paths are a strong indicator of the existence of informal networks linking units, because advancing executives will retain many of their personal ties to their old units. 5 We also needed to consider the direction of information flow along the links. We begin with symmetric measures, with links both to and from the previous and current units. We then analyze links asymmetrically, according to the flow of information. When information from an old unit is brought forward to the new unit, we call this a forward link. When information flows back from a new unit to the old unit, we call this a backward link. The asymmetric analysis clarifies the causality of the relationships and helps refine our understanding of information flow.
Market Segments. We used the companies' SEC filings to identify their services and products. The reports offer detailed information. The eight companies offered 151 distinct services over the 15-year study period. We defined a segment as opening for potential entry the first year that one of the firms began offering the service.
Information Dimensions of Market Segments.
Using the same 25 information dimensions by which we characterized operating units, we coded each market segment for its information dimensions. Table 3 gives examples of the coding for several market segments.
Entry. We considered entry to have occurred if, in a given year, a firm offered a service that it had not offered in previous years. The universe of potential market entries included the 151 market segments that at least one company in the sample entered during the study period. Potential entry began in the year that at least one firm established a market segment. The analysis for each firm excluded markets where the firm was active in the first year of the study, giving a total of 1,032 firm-market pairs in which we tracked firm entry. This gave us a total sample of 15,225 firmmarket-year observations and 7,228 potential entries in which a firm could have entered market segments that it did not already serve. As an example, Table 4 lists Ameritech's market entries between 1985 and 1997. In total, we found 321 entries during the study period.
Other Influences. We defined several control variables, three at the market level and one at the firm level. "Segment information dimensions" (row 22 on Table A in the appendix) summed the number of information dimensions that each segment encompassed, thereby addressing market attractiveness. "Previous entrants into segment" (row 23 on Table A in the appendix) recorded the number of prior entries by other firms, also providing a control for market attractiveness. "Year segment established" (row 24) measured the year a segment emerged. At the firm level, we measured the activities of each firm through the numbers of markets served in nine categories; this controls for firm capabilities in broad service categories.
Empirical Specification
We use event-history analysis to estimate the propensity of firms to enter a given market over the period of the study. Event-history analysis estimates the likelihood that an event will occur within a sample of subjects (Blossfeld and Rohwer 1995, Cleves et al. 2002) . In parametric analysis, event-history techniques specify a distribution that models the propensity of an event to take place and determine how independent variables shift this propensity up or down. For our study, we do not have a priori theoretical expectations of entry patterns by the firms over time. For this reason we use piecewise exponential analysis, which estimates separate baseline hazard rates in each period, drawing the distribution of risk across time directly from the data. This is a good procedure when there are not strong theoretical reasons to choose a specification of duration dependence (Carroll and Hannan 2000) . Our model estimates the hazard rate h t x j = exp 0 + x j x in which the covariates, x j , include an indicator for each time period in the sample. In addition, we need to address firm-specific influences. We observe eight firms that could potentially enter 151 different markets. Each firm-market pair makes a separate observation over time, but we expect each firm to share some propensity to enter across the different markets. We use a shared frailty model (Blossfeld and Rohwer 1995) to account for this shared effect within the different firms. In this approach, the hazard function includes a shared propensity within a group as a multiplicative effect. The technique is analogous to random effects in limited dependent variables models, which partition the error term into a correlated effect within groups (Cleves et al. 2002, p. 275) .
The results were robust to a wide variety of specifications and models. We considered parametric survival models with Weibull and exponential distributions of survival, a semiparametric Cox survival model corrected for shared variance within firms, and pooled cross-sectional analysis with logistic regression of entry using fixed-firm effects. The sensitivity analysis discusses these comparisons. Table 5 presents estimates for four models, all based on piecewise exponential estimation of the hazard of entry (for brevity, the tables suppress time period effects). Model 1 presents results for unit structure.
Results
Model 2 adds linkage variables, using symmetric links that assume the movement of an executive creates information links to both the unit the executive leaves and the unit the executive joins. Model 3 treats the linkage variables as forward measures, in which a link brings information from an executive's old units to the new unit. Model 4 treats the linkage variables as backward measures, providing information from an executive's new unit to the former units. Overall, the results suggest that the units and links in a firm both enable and constrain entry into new markets.
Unit Information Infrastructure
We begin by considering the effects of fit units. Consistent with Hypothesis 1a, we find a positive and significant relationship between fit units and market entry in all models. The firms in the sample are more likely to enter a market when they have more units that overlap some dimensions of the market; for instance, a telecommunications firm with a computer retailing unit and an equipment leasing unit is more likely to enter the computer training market than a firm with only a unit devoted to computer retailing. Thus, the results support the argument that overlap between the information infrastructure of the firm and the market enables entry by providing the firm with rich information about the opportunity in that segment. Based on the exponentiated coefficients for the model, a firm with no fit units that adds a single fit unit will increase its likelihood of entry by about 5%.
The results also are consistent with Hypothesis 1b, which predicted that firms with more nonfit units in relation to a market would be less likely to enter that market. All models report a negative and significant relationship between nonfit units and market entry. An increase from zero nonfit units to one nonfit unit will cause about a 3% reduction in the likelihood of entry. Thus, firms appear to be constrained by competing information about other markets.
We considered the possibility that reverse causality drives the results for Hypotheses 1a and 1b such that each entry causes an increase in fit units and a decrease in nonfit units. Our modeling strategy helps avoid this problem by lagging the independent variables, so that the number of units of each type precedes the entry decision. For entry to cause structure, then, there would need to be a pattern of entry that systematically emphasized a single type of market, which might cause the firm to create units that fit that market type and generate a highly correlated distribution of fit and nonfit units across years. Therefore, we analyzed the firms' patterns of market entry by Gulick's categories and found that all eight firms had substantial distribution of entries across market types. There was no pattern of entry into a single type of 0 20 1 01 * p < 0 05 (one-tailed tests); * * p < 0 01; * * * p < 0 001%. Positive coefficient = more likely to enter; n = 15 225 (7,228 potential entries); firm-market pairs = 1 032; entries = 321; time period intercepts not shown; standard errors in parentheses.
market and hence no reason that units the firms created to fit one market would be fit for the next market entered. We concluded that reverse causation is unlikely to lead to the observed results.
Symmetric Horizontal and Vertical Links
We now turn to considering the effects of information links between units. We begin with Model 2, which treats links as symmetric information channels. Under this assumption, we treat links as running symmetrically from executives' current to former positions and from former to current positions. This contrasts with the asymmetric approaches we describe later, in which we pool information only within current positions (forward linkages) or within former positions (backward linkages).
Model 2 reports intriguing results for symmetric links between units. The results are not consistent with Hypothesis 2a, which predicted that links between fit units would increase market entry, because the coefficient for fit-fit links is positive but not significant. By contrast, the findings are consistent with Hypothesis 2b, which predicted that more links between fit and nonfit units would lead to a greater propensity to enter a given market: Links between fit and nonfit units have a significant positive impact on entry. The findings are counter to Hypothesis 2c, which predicted that firms with more links between nonfit units would be less likely to enter markets. Instead, the relationship between nonfit-nonfit links and entry is positive and significant, such that sharing of information between unrelated units of a firm increases the likelihood that the firm will enter a market. Thus, links between nonfit units appear to enable entry rather than constrain it. This might occur because increased sharing of information of any type enables innovation by increasing new combinations of information or because an increase in links between nonfit units indicates unobserved sharing between fit units.
Overall, Model 2 shows that links between units play a greater role in enabling entry than in constraining expansion. The influence of all links between units is uniformly positive, with significant effects for fit-nonfit and nonfit-nonfit links and insignificant effects for fit-fit links. We note that fit-unit links correlate with fit-nonfit links r = 0 64 . Indeed, fit-unit links have a significant impact on entry when the fitnonfit variable is excluded. Thus, links between units generally enable entry opportunities, with the greatest effect arising among nonfit units.
In contrast to the positive findings related to links between units, Model 2 shows that links to the corporate level tend to constrain entry. The results do not support Hypothesis 3a, which predicted that links from fit units to the corporate level would increase entry. Instead we find a significant negative relationship between fit vertical links and market entry in Model 2. We reasoned that sending information from fit units to the corporate level would help the units garner the resources and political support necessary to launch a new product. But information from the corporate level might also emphasize financial perspectives and encourage executives to weigh the uncertain gains of innovation against the certain costs of experimentation. This could, in turn, reduce firms' willingness to risk entering new markets.
The results in Model 2 are consistent with Hypothesis 3b, which predicted that links from nonfit units to the corporate level would constrain entry into a given market. This effect is negative and significant. Links between nonfit units and the corporate level indicate that the center of gravity in a firm is weighted towards other aspects of the environment, dampening entry. It is consistent with the interpretation we raised with Hypothesis 3a, that links from the corporate level to the unit level might constrain more than enable action because such links are powerful conduits for corporate executives' preoccupation with firm-level performance, instead of a particular unit's interests.
Asymmetric Horizontal and Vertical Links
The fact that we measure information links through the career paths of executives introduces a potential bias. Links run along promotion paths, so they could reflect increasing levels of operating unit influence and prestige as executives are promoted. If executives tend to be promoted to units with more resources and opportunities, then firms with more links to fit units might be more likely to enter market segments because of the units' influence, rather than because of information passed through informal networks. Models 3 and 4 consider asymmetric links between units in order to distinguish between the role of information sharing and the role of influence. Influence would be the most compelling explanation if entry rises only when executives move from nonfit to fit units, because later units will tend to be higher in a promotion path and more influential. By contrast, the information explanation will be more tenable if entry influences arise from both fit-nonfit and nonfitfit links, since information will pass between units in both cases. In general, the results show that executive paths from fit to nonfit and from nonfit to fit units increase the likelihood of entry into a market; the information perspective is most consistent with this pattern. Model 3 presents the effects of forward links, which represent information paths from an executive's previous units to a new unit. Model 4 presents the effects of backward links, which represent information paths from the executive's current unit to previous units.
The results for forward links in Model 3 are similar to the symmetric links results in Model 2. Fitunit links (Hypothesis 2a) have no effect in either model. Links combining fit and nonfit units (Hypothesis 2b) enhance entry in both models. Nonfit-unit links (Hypothesis 2c) remain positive in Model 3 but lose significance.
Note that the positive effect of fit-nonfit links in Model 3 holds whether an executive moves from a nonfit unit to a fit unit (nonfit-fit) or from a fit unit to a nonfit unit (fit-nonfit). The difference in coefficients for fit-nonfit and nonfit-fit links is not statistically significant. Together, these results are consistent with the explanation that links between units enable entry by facilitating the sharing of information about different parts of the environment.
The vertical linkage results in Models 2 and 3 are similar. Both the corporate-fit (Hypothesis 3a) and corporate-nonfit (Hypothesis 3b) influences remain negative in Model 3, although the fit-unit influence becomes insignificant. Thus, firms with nonfit units that share executives with the corporate level are particularly unlikely to undertake market expansion opportunities. This effect would arise if current corporate executives tend to rely on information from their former colleagues in nonfit units when assessing market opportunities for new operating unit expansions.
The backward linkage results in Model 4 are uniformly insignificant. Horizontal and vertical links, which could carry information from an executive's current unit to former units, have no effect on market entry. This suggests that information about old and new units aggregates in executives' new positions, rather than at their former positions. In the case of backward links, a manager promoted to a new unit might pass back information about the environment and the organization to former colleagues, only to find that those colleagues lack the perspective required to process and act on that information. With forward links, on the other hand, promoted managers can draw upon experience in both units, making the transmission of information between units more effective.
6
Other Influences Several control variables in Table 5 influence entry. The previous-entrants variable is positive and significant. This is consistent with the presence of powerful institutional effects-firms follow their cohort into markets if the segment proves popular. In addition, the year a segment is first established has a significant positive influence on entry in the models with symmetric and forward links (Models 2 and 3). Firms appear somewhat more likely to enter markets that opened later in our observation period.
Experience providing other services also affected firms' propensity to enter new markets, suggesting that firm capabilities arising from specific activities have an effect on entry that is separate from the structure of those activities. The more mobile services a firm offered, the more likely it was to enter a given market (Models 1 and 3). Entry was reduced by an increased market presence in third-party interconnection services (Models 2 and 3), manufacturing segments (Models 1-4), and noncommunication markets (Models 2 and 3).
The time distribution of entry, which Table 5 does not report, tends to be significant and multipeaked in the various models. Hence, piecewise modeling appears to be the most appropriate choice for this setting. In broad terms, the propensity to enter appears to first fall and then increase gradually, though sporadically, over time. This pattern corresponds with a situation in which the newly independent Bell companies undertake early expansions following the AT&T divestiture, next slow their expansions to digest the first moves, and then subsequently increase their rate of expansion.
Sensitivity Analysis
We conducted extensive sensitivity analysis by estimating the effects of the variables under different specifications of the entry model. Forward links appear to represent the underlying connection that 6 Backward and forward links are mirror images, so it may at first be counterintuitive to find different levels of significance for links that correlate perfectly in the full sample. The different effects arise because the links relate to different risk sets. The backward links have an impact in relation to markets where the count of fit and nonfit units is different from that for the forward links. Thus, it is possible for two variables that correlate in the full sample to have different effects based on the specific instances where they influence entry.
influences entry, so we estimate these models with forward links. We found that signs and significance remain consistent with the four supported hypotheses (1a, 1b, 2b, and 3b). The core findings are robust to different parametric specifications of the time distribution of entry (Weibull and exponential). The results are similar when they are modeled in a semiparametric Cox equation. Similarly, the results are robust to a pooled, cross-sectional logit model of entry with fixed firm effects. Thus, we find results consistent with Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 2b, and 3b under parametric specifications of time, under semiparametric modeling of hazard rates, and in an alternative parametric logistic regression approach.
Discussion and Conclusions
We argue that information infrastructure focuses the firm like a lens, gathering and shaping information from the environment. We identify two structural building blocks: the business units into which firms divide themselves and the links that enable firms to share information across unit boundaries. We show that these elements of information infrastructure both enable and constrain firms' actions, leading toward some paths and away from others.
The number of business units that fit or do not fit a given market opportunity creates both opportunities and constraints. The more units that scan areas of the environment related to a given market, the more likely a firm will enter that market. Having more information about different aspects of a market makes a firm more likely to enter that market. On the other hand, the presence of more units oriented away from a market makes an organization likely to filter the information it gathers about that market. Having more nonfit units gathering information unrelated to a market decreases the likelihood of entry into that market.
Horizontal links between units amplify the unit effects. Links between units act as enabling connections, encouraging entry through the sharing of complementary information throughout the firm. The information flowing through horizontal links appears most influential when it provides a unique or contrasting perspective on the environment, since links between fit units do not affect entry. In particular, links between fit and nonfit units have consistently positive and significant effects on entry. When firms share nonoverlapping information about different market opportunities, they appear more likely to pursue those opportunities. Links that bring together information from different parts of the environment represent new flows of information that can lead to novel combinations of productive resources. Across all types of units, links between units tend to encourage market entry since their effect is uniformly positive (though not always significant), even when they link nonfit units. The sharing of information between units of the firm appears to increase the dynamism of the firm no matter the type of unit. Links between units may help create an informationrich environment in which the many perspectives available to managers enable innovation. The links may also lead to market entry because the movement of managers represents new combinations of managerial skills, which lead to new combinations of productive resources. Future research needs to disaggregate information networks and the bundles of skills that managers build as they move around a firm. Vertical links to the corporate level create significant constraints on entry by firms. The more executives move between the corporate level and nonfit units, the less likely a firm will enter a market. This suggests that links between the corporate level and nonoverlapping parts of the environment lead firms to suppress information about potential opportunities. This aspect of organizations has been called the "center of gravity" (Galbraith and Kazanjian 1986) . This study suggests that the center of gravity acts as a constraint by filtering information.
The strikingly different effects of forward and backward links suggest that people play a vital role in information infrastructure as information processors. Only forward links affect entry. Forward links represent information flow from a unit where a manager used to work to a unit where the manager currently works. Thus, in forward links unit executives possess experience at the linked unit and a deeper understanding to place the information in context. Backward links, on the other hand, represent information flow from a unit where a manager currently works to the unit where the manager used to work. In this case, executives do not have experience in the linked unit. It appears that only with the appropriate experience will executives use information from other units in their own decision-making process.
While a firm's information infrastructure focuses its attention, its organizational capabilities also will affect its expansion choices. This means that one needs to disentangle information-processing effects of units from the effects of the capabilities embedded in those units. In part, we do this by controlling for the set of markets that each firm serves, which will require different capabilities. In addition, the link results strengthen the argument that structure shapes evolutionary paths, because links represent a more purely structural aspect of the organization. Many fewer of the organization's broadly embedded routines will reside in a single individual who moves between units. Although executive pathways are consistent with the accumulation and transfer of individual capabilities, which are part of the resources of the firm, many of the most important and difficult-to-imitate capabilities of the firm are embedded in multiperson routines that are unlikely to move with a single individual (Helfat 2003) . Thus, our linkage findings align with the proposition that the firm's information infrastructure enables and constrains market entry, as a complementary effect to that of the firm's capabilities.
This work helps advance evolutionary theory. A substantial body of research has developed the idea that initial conditions shape the evolutionary path of organizations. In contrast, we find that information infrastructure will lead firms with the same initial capabilities (such as the former AT&T divisions in our sample) to move into different markets over time, highlighting the importance of the information environment of firms. Information has always been an explicit component of the behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert and March 1992 , March and Simon 1958 , Nelson and Winter 1982 , Simon 1947 , while information processing in contingency theory provided careful analysis of the structure of organizations. Our study, along with the literature on search and innovation (Ahuja and Katila 2001 , Martin and Mitchell 1998 , Rosenkopf and Nerkar 2001 , suggests that evolutionary studies of organizations need to incorporate the mechanisms of information processing to develop more fully a dynamic theory of the firm.
The study has limits. Replication in a different industry would require new information dimensions. Less fine-grained information dimensions for firms in multiple industries could lead to lower levels of overlap between potential markets and existing units, which might lead to different results. Moreover, we cannot separate the effects of informal communication networks and the skills of managers developed through promotions between units, so future research must work out these separate influences on innovation and market entry.
Information processing opens new areas for studying the underlying mechanisms by which firms create and maintain organizational capabilities. In light of the finding that links between units tend to increase entry and corporate links tend to decrease entry, the role of these horizontal and vertical links in dynamic firms deserves more study. Future research could study how information infrastructure affects corporate exit from markets. One could also investigate adaptation mechanisms by examining the separate evolutionary influence of executive experience and communication networks as executives are promoted. In addition, studies could examine other aspects of structure-such as centralization and decentralization-that might influence the evolution of business organizations. Variable  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15   1  1 Variable  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32 
